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Salken: New York's Codification

A BRIEF LOOK AT NEW YORK'S EFFORTS TO
CODIFY ITS LAW OF EVIDENCE
Hon. George C. Pratt:
From there we will move onto Professor Barbara Salken, Pace
University. Professor Salken is going to talk about the need to
codify the rules of evidence in the state, perhaps, somewhat akin
to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
ProfessorBarbaraC. Salken*:
INTRODUCTION

Good Morning. Thank you, Judge Pratt. I am going to speak to
you today about New York's long and somewhat tortuous efforts
to codify its law of evidence. 1 Most of us think of New York as
one of the nation's most progressive states. After all, it was one
of the first jurisdictions to legalize abortion, 2 has been in the
forefront of environmental regulation, 3 and ironically, has been
the historic leader in American codification movements. 4 Yet,
New York is one of only seven states that has not codified its law

* Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., Skidmore College, 1969;
J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1975.
1. This speech was based on a previously published article, Barbara C.
Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That is the Question: A Study of New
York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641 (1992).
2. See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1970). This
rule states: "An abortional act is justifiable when committed upon a female
with her consent by a duly licensed physician acting (a) under a reasonable
belief that such is necessary to preserve her life or (b) within twenty-four
weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy." Id.
3. See 1911 N.Y. LAWS 647 (prohibiting sludge and other pollutants to be

placed in the vicinity of oyster beds and providing both criminal penalties and
liability for damage).
4. See Salken, supra note 1, at 649-52 nn. 46-73 and accompanying text.
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of evidence. 5 It is not as if New York has ignored the debate.
There have been efforts to codify its law of evidence for almost
150 years. 6 Six complete codes have been offered to the New
York legislature, each meeting the same unsuccessful fate. 7 As in
many of our sister states, the modern efforts to codify have been
sparked by the decision to codify the Federal Rules of Evidence.
During the 1950's and 60's, the rules of evidence in federal
courts came under attack for two principal reasons. First, federal
procedural rules made it difficult to identify whose evidence law
(state or federal) applied in a particular case. 8 Secondly, the
entire body of evidence law had been criticized for many years
by academic commentators for being archaic and confusing. 9 It
took the Supreme Court and Congress over ten years to finally
enact the Federal Rules of Evidence. 10 Both the widespread
interest in the possibility of uniform evidence law and general
satisfaction with the final product led to substantial interest
among the states in codifying their own law. Thirty-four of the
forty-three states that have codified their evidence law have done
so based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. 11
5. See Salken, supra note 1, at 642 (stating that New York, Connecticut,
Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts and Virginia are the only states
without evidence codes).
6. See Salken, supra note 1, at 652-62 nn. 74-150 and accompanying
text.
7. See Salken, supra note 1, at 653, 659-62 nn. 80-85, 125-50 and
accompanying text.

8. See Salken, supra note 1, at 656 nn. 104-06 and accompanying text.
9. See Salken, supra note 1, at 656-57 nn. 107-10 and accompanying
text.
10. See Salken, supra note 1, at 657-58 nn. 111-19 and accompanying
text.
11. The thirty-four states that have codified their law of evidence on the
model of the Federal Rules of Evidence are: ALASKA STAT., R. EvID. §§ 1011103 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., R. EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1992); ARK.
R. EviD. §§ 101-1102 (Michie 1992); COLO. REV. STAT., R.
EvID. §§ 101-1103 (1984 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN., R. EvID. §§ 1011103 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101-.958 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992);
HAW. REV. STAT., R. EvID. §§ 101-1102 (1985 & Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE
R. EVID., §§ 101-1103 (1992); IOWA CODE, R. EvID., §§ 101-1103 (1984 &
Supp. 1992); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. (West Sp. Pamph. 1992); ME. REV.

CODE ANN.,
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I. NEW YORK'S ATTEMPT AT CODIFICATION
Like the rest of the country, New York considered joining the
Federal Rules of Evidence bandwagon. In 1976, a team of
consultants was formed to research and draft a code, and an
advisory panel was created to screen the product before
submission to the legislature.1 2 New York's first modern efforts
were not designed to mimic the federal rules. Rather, the federal
rules were to be the organizational model with California's
Evidence Code and New York's common law as substantive
guide posts. 13 It turned out, however, that the draft code was
(West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS, R. EVID. §§ 1011103 (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN., R. EVID. 50 §§ 101-1101 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-1 to -153 (1972 & Supp. 1991);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-10-101 to -1008 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27101 to -1103 (1988 & Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§47.020-52.395
(1991); N.H. R. EVD. §§ 100-1103 (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN., R. EVID.
§§ 11-101 to -102 (Michie 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rules 101 to 1102
(1988); N.D. CENT. CODE, R. EvID. §§ 101-1103 (1990-91); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN., R. EviD. §§ 101-1103 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, §§ 2101-3103 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40-010 to 585 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWs, R. EvID. (1991-92); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 19-9-1 to 19-18-8 (1987 & Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN., R. EVID.
§§ 101-1102 (1990-91); TEX. CODE ANN., TEX. Civ. R. EVID., and TEX.
CRIM. CODE EVID. (1990-91); UTAH CODE ANN., R. EVID. (1992); VT. STAT.
ANN., R. EvD. §§ 101-1103 (1983 & Supp. 1991): WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 5.04-5.64 (West 1963 & Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE, R. EvID. §§ 1011102 (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.01-911.02 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991);
Wyo. STAT., R. Evm. §§ 101-1103 (1979).
Four other states have codes that pre-date the Federal Rules: ALA. CODE
§§ 12-21-1 to -285 (1986 & Supp. 1992); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1-1605 (\Vest
1966 & Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401 to -470 (1985 & Supp.
1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-1 to -49 (Weat 1976 & Supp. 1992).
The remaining five states have modem codes that are not based on the
federal model: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-1-1 to -154 (Michie 1982 & Supp.
1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.01-.990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992);
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 490.010-.170 (1986 & Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
42, § 6101 (1982 & Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 19-1-10 to -70 (Law.
Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991).
STAT. ANN., R. EVID.

12. STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION
FOR 1977, at 10 (1977).
11- Id. at 13.
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much more like the Federal Rules of Evidence than anyone had
anticipated.1 4 The final bill was sent to committee, where it died
the slow death of a study bill. A very similar bill was submitted a
few years later and found a similar fate. 15 The latest effort took a
different track and came much closer to passing.
In 1980, the Law Revision Commission formed a working
group, headed by Professor Robert Pitler of Brooklyn Law
School, which genuinely tried to codify New York's common
law. 16 At one point, the group even tried to create its own
numbering system. In the end, however, the universal language
that the federal numbering system has become made creating a
system unique to New York counter-productive. The substantive
rules of the proposal, however, are very true to New York's
common law.
Codifying New York's common law of evidence was no easy
task. New York's law is dispersed throughout both judicial
decisions and statutes. In fact, some individual rules are found in
both decisional and statutory law. 17 Additionally, even though
New York has a significant amount of its law already in statutes,
these provisions are widely scattered over 9000 frequently
unrelated statutory provisions. 18 The latest draft succeeds in
creating a code that reflects New York's common law, proposing
changes only in those areas where there is a genuine need for
reform. In some instances, the code accepts a provision from the
federal rules, and sometimes the reform is entirely new,
benefiting from lessons learned under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. But by and large, the latest proposal is an accurate
codification of New York's common law. I find it a fabulous
resource for comparing New York law to the Federal Rules of
14. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Trends, Developments, New York Tal
Practice: Code of Evidence, 183 N.Y. L.J. 1 (May 9, 1980).
15. See Salken, supra note 1, at 660-61 nn. 138-45 and accompanying
text.
16. See NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A CODE OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK XIX (Mar. 21, 1991).
17. See Salken, supra note 1, at 664 nn. 158-61 and accompanying text.
18. See Eugene R. Canudo and Harold Korn, Proposalfor Codification of
the New York Law of Evidence, 45 N.Y. ST. B. J. 527-28 (1973).
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Evidence, and I keep a copy of it on reserve in my school's
library for my students to use.
Unfortunately, this latest draft has done no better in the
legislature than its predecessors, notwithstanding the support of
Governor Mario Cuomo and a reduction in the traditional
opposition experienced by codification efforts that more clearly
followed the Federal Rules of Evidence. This last proposal has
joined its ancestors for a long rest in the Codes Committee, with
no expectation that it will ever see the light of day.
II. SUPPORT FOR CODIFICATION LACKS THE
NECESSARY SUPPORT
Why can't New York pass an evidence code? As with so many
of the recurring issues before the legislature, the outcome
depends primarily on the political benefits or defects associated
with passage of a code and very little on whether codification
would be good for New York. Before we look at the merits of
codification, let us briefly see between whom the dispute exists.
The crux of the problem may be that there is simply no
political constituency for codifying the law of evidence. Except
for lawyers, who cares whether the law of evidence is codified or
not? Certainly not the general public. There may be particular
trials that include unpopular rulings that briefly raise support for
some specific legislation, 19 but this a far cry from any interest in
legislating the whole of the common law of evidence and
rounding up the myriad statutory provisions to create an
organized, logical, and modern body of law to take into the
courtrooms. In fact, of the thirty-four state codes based on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, only ten of the bills were legislatively
proposed. 20 The remainder were rules promulgated by the states'
high courts and either became automatically effective or shortly
19. An example of this occurred in New Jersey in the case of Arthur
Seale, who was convicted of murdering Exxon Executive Sidney Reso. This
case is discussed in Salken, supra note 1, at 698 nn. 343-45 and accompanying
text.
20. See Salken, supra note 1, at 699 n. 348 and accompanying text.
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became law if the legislature did not promptly act to delay or
21
reject the promulgation.
In New York, it is the legislature, with all its political baggage,

that must accept or reject an evidence code. It was of particular
interest to me in trying to figure out why we could not pass a
code to learn that the same people opposed codification

regardless of whether their individual objections were addressed
by the drafters. There was opposition even after the successful

effort to draft a code that did no more than enact the current law.
I learned that codification is most stridently opposed by the
defense bar. The criminal defense bar was certainly the most
vociferous of the objectors, 22 but it was not alone. I found civil
lawyers

who

principally

represented

defendants 23

equally

opposed to codification efforts, while trial associations, bar
associations, law professors, and the District Attorneys, with
some reservations, 24 favored codification. 25 Since all the modern

trends and all the modern codifications let in more evidence than
is admissible under common law, it is not surprising that the
proponents of codification in New York are lawyers who usually
21. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., R. EVID. (1994); COLO. REV.
(1984 & Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN., R. EvID. (1980 &
Supp. 1994).
22. See, e.g., Proposed Code of Evidence for the State of New York; Joint
Public Hearing on New York State Law Revision Commission, Senate Standing
Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on the Judiciary,
Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly Standing Committee on
Codes 36 (July 24, 1990) (testimony of Gerald Lefcourt, on behalf of the New
York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); Id. at 290-96
(testimony of Archibald Murray, on behalf of the Legal Aid Society); Id. at
287-310 (testimony of Eric Seiff, on behalf of the New York Criminal Bar
Association); Id. at 130-34 (testimony of Peter McShane, on behalf of the New
York State Defenders' Association).
23. See James M. Furey, Position Paper on the Proposed Code of
Evidence by the Tort Reparations Committee of the New York State Bar
Association (1982); see also letter from David Siegel, Distinguished Professor
of Law, Albany Law School, to Edward J. Hart, Chair of the New York State
Tort Reparations Committee (Feb. 1I, 1984) (on file with the author).
24. See Salken, supra note 1, at 663 n. 154 and accompanying text.
25. See Salken, supra note 1, at 662-63 nn. 151-56 and accompanying
text.
STAT., R. EvID.
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have the burden of proof, and the opponents are lawyers who
must defend against their opposition's offer of proof.26
Personalities also count. As trial lawyers, the defense bar has
more confidence that it will be able to sway the trial judge with
lawyering skills, unencumbered by a specific rule at issue.
Defense lawyers prefer the more comfortable stance of arguing
fairness and prejudice, which so frequently persuades a trial
judge. This personality or background issue may also contribute
to the opposition experienced when the various bills get to the
legislature. Many of the legislators are former defense attorneys
and, for many years, the guardian of the all-important door from
the Assembly Codes Committee has been a long-time opponent of
codification, going back to his early training with the Legal Aid
Society. 27
III. WOULD NEW YORK BENEFIT FROM
CODIFICATION?
Well, let us move to the merits of the claim. Should we codify
the law of evidence or should we remain with our traditional
common law development? Historically, there have been three
arguments in favor of codification of any law: codification makes
the law more accessible; codification permits more uniform
application of the law; and codification will permit systematic
reform. The same arguments have led the debate in New York.
To me, the strongest of these arguments is the first. I think the
law of evidence is hard to find. The law of evidence should be in
every lawyer's pocket or purse whenever he or she is in court.
The judge needs a copy directly on the bench. The three-way
immediate conversations that follow the cry of an objection
should start from the same place. It may be that extended
dialogue or even a recess for research will be needed in a
particular case, but evidentiary rulings are, by and large, handed
26. See Salken, supra note 1, at 692- 93 nn. 312-18 and accompanying
text.
27. James Yates, formerly Legislative Counsel to the Speaker of the

Assembly and prior to that counsel to the House Codes Committee.
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down from the bench in the heat of a trial, and we need to move
that initial discussion to language that has meaning to all of the
participants.
Opponents argue that codification is not necessary because the
law is easy to find and everyone already knows what it is.
Opponents to codification argue that we already have two nice
single volume treatises, Richardson on Evidence28 or Fisch on
Evidence,29 that can and should be brought into eveiy courtroom.
My experience tells me that Richardson and Fisch are just not
doing the job. Evidence is hard to learn and hard to work with. It
will continue to be difficult even with a code. After all, the
Federal Rules of Evidence did not turn us all into evidence
scholars. However, I think the absence of a code makes it more
difficult than it has to be.
In 1992-93, I spent a sabbatical year in the Manhattan District
Attorney's office participating in some, and watching other, cases
during trial. I was fortunate enough to share case loads with very
excellent lawyers and was opposed by experienced and knowledgeable defense teams. However, I was appalled at the level of
knowledge of evidence law I observed. Almost any out-of-court
statement was characterizedas hearsay regardless of the reason it
was being offered. No one had a clue as to the proper foundation
for offering a business record or whether there was a difference
between a business record and a public document. The
performances in the New York Supreme Court were far superior
to those I encountered when I invited Westchester judges to sit
for final trials in my trial practice classes. I had a judge that once
ruled that a witness' testimony was not hearsay because the outof-court declarant was sitting in the courtroom. I have had judges
who would not let a witness publish a document to the jury when
that very witness had just laid the foundation for the document's
successful admission, because the judge felt that "the document
speaks for itself." I have had judges who would not even let
witnesses answer questions about a document that had been
admitted in evidence because "the document speaks for itself."
28. JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE

29. EDITH

(10th ed. 1973).

L. FISCH, FISCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1977).
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Will a code help any of this? I think so. For about thirty years
everyone has been learning evidence law by the federal rules
numbers -- this is a Rule 403 problem, or it is an exception to the
rule prohibiting hearsay under Rule 803(4). We teach the Federal
Rules of Evidence and students learn the Federal Rules of
Evidence. For those who enter New York practice, the Federal
Rules of Evidence become the backdrop against which they make
their New York evidence arguments. Many of the rules are
actually the same, but a New York judge does not want to hear
Rule 803(4). He or she wants to hear what the New York Court
of Appeals has said on that subject, and that is not easy to find
since neither Richardson nor Fisch follow the format of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Since every recently educated lawyer
was trained using the format of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the journey to find the New York equivalent can be tortuous and
sometimes unsuccessful. Codification of New York's evidence
law, particularly following the numbering system used in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, will save hours of court time and
much human effort. 30 I also think it is more likely to produce a
result consistent with the current status of the law in New York.
I am sure Judge Pratt can tell you plenty of war stories about
poor or incorrect evidence arguments made in federal court.
However, I bet he does not have as many stories about judges
developing local rules that completely ignore the Federal Rules of
Evidence. One of the remaining arguments in favor of
codification is that it permits unified application of the law in all
trial courts and appellate divisions. Many local trial court judges
have their own court rules that seem logical and convenient for
running a court room but cannot be found in any case or statute. I
think it is easier for the New York local judges because they do
not have a nice little book that collects all the law in one place.
30. We learned this morning that Professor Richard Farrell of Brooklyn
Law School, is currently completing a revision of Richardson on Evidence.
Included in his work is a reorganizing of the treatise so that it will follow the
format of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This is a wonderful step forward. If
the new Richardson's can finally bring the law into the courtroom. my
principal enthusiasm for codification will be accomplished. See JI.ROSI1n
PRINCE ET AL., RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE (I I th ed. Iorthcoming.
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Additionally, it is the rare instance that an appellate court will
even know about these private rules. Evidence law, after all, is
almost entirely a trial court call; it rarely gets mentioned in
appellate cases, and even more rarely is it the subject of appellate
reversal. Thus, trial court evidence rules can be unique in
circumstances in which other rules would not survive. I think the
introduction of a little book containing the law of evidence will
reduce the incentive for developing new "private rules" and may
even give everyone the sense that the floor has been swept clean,
so that the law in the little book will be the new starting point,
erasing "private rules" that currently exist.
The last argument in favor of codification has been that it can
permit a systematic reform effort to .modernize and clarify
existing law. Although the most recent proposal made significant
progress in clearing up what the law currently is, political
restraints limited the amount of reform that could be proposed.
Any hope that might have existed for the passage of this proposal
in the legislature's current climate depended upon a reliable and
faithful reproduction of the law as it stands. So for New York,
reform may not be a strong argument in favor of codification.
This political quagmire also adds support to one of the
opposition's strongest arguments, that codification will freeze the
development of the law. Although I do not think the law will be
entirely frozen at the point of codification, one must admit that
the role of the courts will certainly be changed. Once the law of
evidence is codified, the courts will no longer be able to develop
new concepts and let the law grow in the slow incremental
fashion case-by-case adjudication requires. Instead of seeking
justice in the individual case, the courts will be limited to
interpreting the intent of the legislature when it drafted the code.
This does not mean that the law of evidence will come to a
standstill and will be unable to move and grow as new problems
develop. Courts will always be called on to interpret the law and
significant changes will be made in this way. 3 1

31. See Salken, supra note 1, at 684- 89 nn. 267-300 and accompanying
text.
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Courts are not the only way to get meaningful change. Recent
reform of evidence law has been much more likely from the
legislature than from the courts. In fact, New York's Court of
Appeals has been far away from the cutting edge of evidence
law. New York's law of evidence is one of the more archaic
collections of evidence rules in existence. For instance, New
York is one of the few jurisdictions that continue the ancient
voucher rule, which limits the ability of a lawyer to challenge a
32
witness the lawyer has called to the stand.
Like all appellate courts, the New York Court of Appeals
cannot always change a rule even when it wants to. Courts must
follow precedent and can only consider a question when it is
actually posed in a real case. The legislature, on the other hand,
is free to jump in whenever an issue presents itself. Assuming
that the legislature would consider codification at all, there is no
reason to think that it would not accept amendments if they
become appropriate.
Ironically, this brings us to the last substantial objection raised
by the opponents of codification. The opposition, led by the
defense bar, is afraid that the evidence code will become a
frequent subject of amendment and will result in politicizing the
32. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1994); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233 § 23 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); N.J. R. EVID. 20
(Gann 1991 & Supp. 1993); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 607 (Page's 1991 &
Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-.43 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994); see
also Castillow v. Browning - Ferris Indus., Inc., 591 So.2d 43 (Ala. 1991)
(stating that a hostile witness is an exception to Alabama's general rule that an
attorney cannot impeach his own witness); State v. Smith, 82 A.2d 816 (Conn.
1951) (holding that since the State was surprised by witness's actions, they
were allowed to impeach him); Poole v. State, 428 A.2d 434 (Md. 1981)
(stating that only surprise, hostility, or deceit are exceptions to the voucher
rule); Hall v. State, 165 So. 2d 345 (Miss. 1964) (explaining that witnesses
may be impeached or cross-examined if they are hostile); Commonwealth v.
Brady, 507 A.2d 66 (Pa. 1986) (discussing notion that surprise is not necessary
in allowing a party to impeach their own witness as that rule is flexible in areas
of truth and justice); State v. Gomes, 604 A.2d 1249 (R.I. 1992) (holding that
interest of justice allowed prosecution to impeach own witness even though
they were not completely surprised); State v. Anderson, 406 S.E.2d 152 (S.C.
1991) (stating that the decision to use the voucher rule is within the discretion
of the trial court).
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law in ways that will certainly hurt the criminal defendant.
Defense lawyers fear that every time a big trial results in an
acquittal, and some evidence provision can be identified as the
culprit, the legislature will run in and make new law, responding
to the injustice perceived in the newsworthy case without
considering whether the reform has truly long-lasting benefits and
considers policy and reliability questions.
To understand whether this fear is justified, I studied the
amendments in the ten states where codes had been adopted by
the legislature and the amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence in the almost thirty years of their existence. My
research simply does not support the fears of the objectors. Big
trials may make bad law, but the fact of codification is simply not
the stimulus. The legislature knows how to pass an evidence law
whether the rest of the law is codified or not. There is no
evidence that codified jurisdictions amend their law any more
frequently than common law jurisdictions. Common law
jurisdictions are perfectly free to pass particular rules that the
legislature feels public pressure demands, whether the
jurisdiction has a code or not. 33 New York's common law system
did not stop the legislature from enacting a pro-victim statute
after model Marla Hanson was slashed and subjected to intrusive
cross-examination. 34 Now, I am not making a statement as to
whether any of these changes are good or bad. It just seems to
me that this kind of tinkering with the law is inevitable and has
nothing to do with the codification movement.
CONCLUSION

Should the law of evidence be codified in New York? I think it
should, but I do not come away from this problem with a strong
sense that codification is a critical imperative. I just think it will
be better. I think it will be clearer and more available. The easier
33. See Salken, supra note 1, at 696-703 nn. 334-69 and accompanying
text.
34. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.43 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994). See
Kevin Sack, New York Limits Use of Sex History in Trials, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 1990, at B3.
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the law is to find, the more likely we will all be speaking the
same language, struggling with the same concepts and eventually
reaching the same conclusions. I do not think not having an
evidence code is a calamity. I think it would be better, as do most
of my academic colleagues. We think it will let us move New
York evidence law into the classroom and permit the students
who become trial lawyers to take it with them when they enter
the courtroom. Maybe Professor Farrell's new Richardson's will
do the same thing. I must admit that I now think the probability
of ever getting the legislature to pass one of these drafts is very
slim. So I wish you good luck, Dick, and look forward to using
Richardson's instead of a code for the foreseeable future. Thank
you all for listening to these ramblings. I hope you learned
something. I certainly enjoyed speaking with you.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you, Professor Salken. I was kind of disappointed at
your last statement. You may be accurate as a predictor. There is
another group that really has an interest in an evidence code and
that is the judges. It is extremely helpful to judges to have the
rules in a single place readily found. It forces lawyers to
categorize their objections.
One comment that Professor Salken made was that there are
very few appellate decisions that turn on evidence questions. This
startled me when I got on the appellate court as a trial lawyer. An
awful lot of my time was spent worrying about evidence
problems, many of which never actually arose in the courtroom,
but you have to be prepared for them. You never know when
your adversary is going to object to something you want to get
in.
On the trial bench, the dominant feature of evidence problems
was the suddenness with which they arose and the urgency for
the need for a decision.
The first trial I ever had as a district judge, we got things
going, picked a jury, opening statements and so forth. and I kind
of sat back and relaxed a little bit.
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The attorney starts questioning the witness and suddenly I hear
an objection. I had not heard the question, of course. And your
instincts, of course are immediately defensive. What grounds?
Hearsay.
I still haven't the foggiest notion what is going on. So I turned
to the other attorney and asked, "What's your response to that?"
He said, "Well, I think it qualifies under the business records
exception."
I go back to the objector, "Why didn't it qualify?" Well, he's
offering this, and so forth. And they state their positions.
Suddenly, dead silence in the courtroom. Every eye in the
courtroom is on me. I am supposed to say overruled or sustained.
And it came as really a shock to me. The whole thing had taken
maybe thirty or forty seconds. And how long can you sit? You
can't very well say, "We'll take a recess, I'll ask my law clerk to
pull down Weinstein on Evidence, and so forth."
Things have to move along, and so you make a decision. They
are important decisions to the parties. They almost are never
outcome determinative decisions.
I can only recall two or three cases that I have sat on as an
appellate judge in the last ten years, where we have reversed
because evidence was admitted or excluded. We frequently talk
about evidence problems, but it is not the reason things get
reversed.
Now, this problem with the pressure and the trial judge is what
gives rise to what Professor Salken described as the development
of local rules. Trial judges need quick identifiers, rules of thumb
that let them respond instinctively to various objections. The
codified rules of the federal rules are very useful in that regard.
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